I. INTRODUCTION
In this text, I shall examine the influence of ethnic minorities on the development of the new democratic regimes in post-socialist Europe. Minorities have played an important and sometimes decisive role in a number of countries. In Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania and Slovakia, the political elites of the ethnic majority have to deal with one or more ethnic minorities.
1 In this article, these countries will be taken into consideration as 'similar cases' in the sense that in each country a single ethnic minority accounts for more than about three per cent of the total population and is settled in one or more regions where it forms a strong minority or even a majority. These criteria were chosen for the research topic of this article, which focuses on established democracies in which minorities have (already) been afforded the right of political participation.
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The right of participation is relevant to the consolidation of democracy, particularly if the political problems of ethnic minorities affect the majority's public life. The inter-1 For more detailed data, see ests of small minorities may be preserved by the granting of low-level territorial autonomy or by the granting of personal autonomy through the support of cultural activities by the state. 3 For example, the German minority in Poland is well integrated into political life in Poland despite the obvious historical liabilities. 4 As a rule of thumb, political conflicts only become relevant on the national level when a minority is so numerous that its pursuit of political, cultural and social rights interferes with the same rights of the ethnic majority (or those of other ethnic minorities).
Quite in contrast to their brutal overall record, the autocratic or semi-autocratic regimes of socialist Europe were able to manage interethnic conflict relatively well.
After Stalin, and apart from the widespread anti-Semitism in many socialist regimes, the autocratic character of the regimes silenced most ethnic groups, which had previously been all too ready to fight with each other. Between the 1950s and the late 1980s, the ethnic minorities of the region did not challenge the political order which, not least because of its centralized character, had not been their most desired outcome.
Even if some experts have previously seen ethnic ruptures as a major reason for the destabilization of the Soviet Union, 5 conflicts with an ethnic flavour reappeared only during Mikhail Gorbachev's Perestroyka and Glasnost.
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During this phase of liberalization, which soon spread to most of Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe, the role of ethnic minorities differed sharply. In simple terms, we have to distinguish between a path to violent (mostly ethnic) conflict and a path to democracy. At first, the striving of minorities for independence and sovereignty seemed to be directed mainly against the constraints of the autocratic regimes. In some countries, such as Ex-Yugoslavia, Moldova and the Southern border of Russia (Chechnya, Abkhazia), the violent character of the conflicts between minorities and majorities increased in intensity.
3 See Georg Brunner, "Autonomiekonzepte zum Minderheitenschutz -Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven", in Gerrit Manssen and Boguslaw Banaszak (eds.), Minderheitenschutz in Mittel-und As it turned out, the main goal of the conflicting parties was not to establish democratic regimes from the ruins of socialist states, but to dominate minorities. The interrelationship between violence and democracy is striking: With the single exception of Slovenia (where the war with Yugoslavia and its Serbian dominated elites lasted only ten days), no state which entered into violent ethnic conflict during the phase of liberalization has been able to develop a fully functioning democracy. In other words, whereas liberalization took off almost everywhere in socialist Europe, it seemed that the phase of democratization could be entered into only in those (old or new) states where the conflicts between majorities and minorities had been solved peacefully.
During democratization, 7 the role of ethnic minorities differed in different states. In Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia and Slovenia, the uprising of an ethnic minority within an old federal state had led to founding elections in new states and eventually to democratic constitutions. 8 Again, with the exception of Slovenia, these new states were confronted with 'new' minorities within their borders. Political leaders who had risen to power not least because of their emphasis on ethnicity issues had to understand the need for legitimacy across ethnic borders.
In Slovakia, it was not the protest of the Slovak minority but rather the conflicting interests of each sub-federal state's political leaders which led to separation. 9 Slovakia then inherited the Hungarian minority which had become a part of Czechoslovakia after World War I, whereas the Czech Republic became a more or less homogeneous nation-state. The Slovak elites faced the added difficulty of having to build up a state structure while dealing with a minority that had more than doubled in relative weight and now had obvious grounds for asking for a degree of autonomy never granted during the existence of Czechoslovakia. Altogether, the only 'old' states able to enter into the democratization process with previous experience of dealing with ethnic minori-7 I am following the typology of liberalization -democratization -consolidation as described by Gui- This short overview shows that despite the differences between the countries, democratization in multiethnic states was accompanied by problems not existing elsewhere.
Democratization in the multiethnic states of Europe was intrinsically more difficult than in the homogeneous national states of the region.
These difficulties had to be dealt with during the phase of democratic consolidation.
Robert Dahl names 'inclusion' and 'participation' as the two major criteria of a functioning, or consolidated, democracy. 10 The problem of multiethnic democracies is precisely that its leaders have to ensure inclusion and participation of 'the people' regardless of an individual's ethnic affiliation. Some post-socialist democracies faced difficulties with this requirement, which lead to regimes such as Latvia being classified as "incomplete" or "defective" democracies during their first period of consolidation. 11 The indicators for democratic inclusion include the range of electoral participation, the relative weight of the minorities' representation in parliament and government, and guarantees of individual and group rights to ethnic minorities. These will be looked at in the next section, which will also give an overview of various strategies for dealing with ethnic minorities in post-socialist democracies.
However, the question remains, whether the strategies of partial exclusion in some countries severely damaged the basis for democratic consolidation or whether the more limited scope for inclusion affected the quality of democracy only temporarily.
In this article, my arguments support the latter statement. My hypothesis, as set out above, is that the leaders of multiethnic transition states had to face difficulties which did not burden the transition of homogeneous nation-states. In cases such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Macedonia the new elites even had to take into consideration a 10 Dahl named these functioning democracies "polyarchies", see Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition (New Haven and London, 1971) .
11 See Juan Linz andAlfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore and London, 1996) and Wolfgang Merkel, Systemtransformation (Opladen, 1999) . It needs to be underlined, however, that these classifications took place some years ago and would probably look different today.
growing and succeeding irredentist movement-comparable to the Slovak within Czechoslovakia. Additionally, the situation in the neighbouring kin-states of the ethnic minorities, Albania (to Macedonia) and Russia (to the Baltic states), seemed quite unpredictable at times, which made it even more difficult to reach reliable agreements with the ethnic minorities.
In section III of this article, I will therefore try to underline that all multiethnic postsocialist democracies were successful in reaching multiethnic political inclusion. As I will try to show, a strategy of not immediately granting minority participation rights may not only lead to complete democratic consolidation in the mid-term but may also lead to a more solid consensus about the character of the multiethnic democratic regime.
II. INCLUSION AND PARTICIPATION OF MINORITIES IN POLITICAL LIFE
When looking at democratic inclusion, we are not concentrating on inclusion in the sense of an objective or subjective line between the poor, marginalized 'excluded' and the rich, integrated, educated 'included'. Although that is to some extent also an issue in theoretical debates on democracy, 12 liberal democratic theory relates much more to political rather than to social inclusion. Robert Dahl, among many others, argues that the only criterion to exclude certain persons from democratic participation is qualification -members of the demos need to be permanent residents of a country (i.e., not tourists or short-term migrants) and they need the competence to follow and understand public issues (which, for example, excludes children). The situation was similar in Latvia. As in Estonia, the general situation of minority rights was in accord with what was required by international law. In the Latvian constitution, Article 114 explicitly mentions national minorities and their right to preserve and develop their language and cultural identity. However, some other laws contained provisions contradicting those standards. Until 1998, Latvia's citizenship law contained the so called 'windows system' which generally made citizenship possible only for individuals belonging to a certain age group. In a heavily debated amendment process culminating in a referendum, the Latvian public narrowly voted for meeting the OSCE recommendations for more moderate naturalization and citizenship rights of non-citizen children born in Latvia. 21 In June 2001, more reforms on naturalization were enacted: The fees to apply for citizenship and language exam requirements were eased. This was a reaction to the fact that only about 40,000 of the 550,000 noncitizens had successfully completed the naturalization process by 2001. During the painful process of making it possible for members of the Russian minority to obtain citizenship, the European Union used its powers to a lesser and lesser extent to ensure minority protection. In 1993, the "protection of minorities" had been mentioned as one of the political Copenhagen criteria for EU accession. 25 The importance ies realized that it would not be possible to ask for a level of minority integration from the new member states which could not be demanded from some of the more important current members. In other words, the Union had to accept that minority conflicts in the enlargement area could not be resolved to a greater extent than in the existing European Union itself.
B. Participation of Ethnic Minorities
The scope of political participation of ethnic minorities is, of course, dependent on the strength of minorities in relation to the majority population. The theory of representation would suggest that normatively this relative strength should be mirrored in the demographics of legislative and executive powers.
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There are several reasons, however, why ethnic minorities are often underrepresented in the institutions of political power. One reason is procedural and concerns the electoral system itself. (Frankfurt, 1991) . be found in the discriminatory intent of a given majority. The first purpose of exclusive elements of electoral systems is rather to seek a reasonable balance between representation and efficiency. 29 Low thresholds for participation mean high degrees of fragmentation which may be considered a burden for smooth decision-making processes.
However, this argument can also be used as a pretext for keeping certain groups out of the political process altogether. Levels of electoral thresholds are a subject of decision-making and they are not always designed to enable the highest degree of minority participation possible. Gaining representation is made more difficult for some of the large minorities as well.
In countries where the electoral threshold is only a few percentage points higher than the relative strength of the minority, minority elites face the task of trying to include a large majority of their population into one political organization. That is certainly true of Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia, but it was also important in Estonia and Latvia during the period when only a small number of minority members were granted citizenship. In Romania and Slovakia, problematic rules were introduced whereby thresholds for common lists were raised in order to keep politically divided minorities out of parliament as a whole. 31 Lithuania raised its threshold from four to five per cent in 1996, giving rise to strong criticism from both the Polish and Russian minorities.
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On the other hand, some measures, which appeared on their face to be acts of deliberate minority discrimination, did not lead to the intended consequence of subduing the minority. In Slovakia, the notoriously divided Hungarian minority finally decided to and became a strong political player with an important "blackmail potential". 33 In Romania, the Hungarian Democratic Union (UDMR) included other minorities in their caucus, strengthening minority representation as a whole (see Table 2 ). In contrast to Estonia, the Latvian Russians were able to gather support on a much larger scale. This was possible because the minority politicians were able to combine forces with well-known Latvian politicians who in a way were guarantors for the loy- With the Democratic Union for Integration (BDI), Albania has seen minority parties in a government coalition for four consecutive terms. In other countries, the minority parties had much more difficulty entering government. When they did, they joined forces with the 'democratic' camp against the 'old' forces which had been able to reestablish themselves in political power. This was the case in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia (and, of course, in many former republics of the Soviet Union). In these countries, changes of power coincided with a push for political minority recognition when the DPS in Bulgaria, the UDMR in Romania and the SMK in Slovakia showed their readiness for society's democratization. This process of democratization also coincided with a strong commitment to Western integration among the minorities. This was not self-evident because another strategy of the minority elites could have been achieving stronger ties with their kin-states. 38 In fact, by joining forces with the anti-establishment forces in the three countries named, the minorities not only accepted but also supported the international community's point of view that minority problems in Europe were not to be resolved by border revision but by autonomy within the existing states. In consequence, government participation by the minorities gave the consolidation of democracy a strong push in a number of countries.
This is a remarkable difference to the situation in the Baltic states where minorities have not only had difficulties in gaining citizenship but also in being represented in parliament or government at all. As Table 3 shows, the Russian, and -in the Lithua- 
III. MINORITIES DURING TRANSFORMATION: A STUMBLING BLOCK FOR DEMOCRACY?
For formerly autocratic countries, granting political rights to ethnic minorities and ensuring their participation is a necessary step in the course of democratization. As seen above, this does not so much follow from international legal obligations concerning ethnic minorities but from general principles of democracy which have to apply to all political subjects of a given territory, including minorities. However, during the transformation process of the multiethnic states of post-socialist Europe, different strategies of granting those democratic rights have been applied. The 'old' states Bulgaria and Romania simply continued to be multiethnic states. Of the 'new' states, Lithuania, Macedonia, and Slovakia were ready to grant citizenship to their minorities from the very beginning of democratization, whereas Estonia and Latvia tried to make their minorities' assimilation a precondition for citizenship.
The author demonstrated in the previous section, that due to international pressure, the two northern Baltic states were forced to soften that approach. Some signs of discrimination still exist as most international law on minority inclusion is 'soft law', setting pre-legislative standards which become relevant in political discourse, but being largely non-enforceable. 40 Where a consensus among the majority or the major- to cut down political rights substantially within a short period of time after coming back to power in 1998.
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In Estonia and Latvia, barring most of the minority population from participation meant avoiding the rise of an ethnically defined minority party. Of course, it cannot be taken for granted that a large Russian party would have turned to an ideology of post-soviet communism. 43 The hostility of both the Estonian and Latvian majorities against the adherents to the former occupational power makes it probable, however, that there would have been at least severe conflicts between the two political camps.
As it happened, with the exclusion of the Russian minority, the political elites of Estonia and Latvia were able to keep a potentially destabilizing cleavage out of the political process. Whereas the setbacks in the Moldovan and Ukrainian transformation process had a direct link to (non-violent) ethnic conflict, Estonia and Latvia were able to consolidate their democracy on a firm elite consensus.
On the other hand, keeping away non-assimilated minorities from political participa- Democratization: Once the autocratic regime has fallen, things change. The striving for self-determination comes into conflict with the understanding of the ethnic majority, which usually had envisioned an end of the regime but not a split-up of the state.
The strategic position of the minority changes as a whole. During liberalization, the oppositional forces of both the majority and the minority share the goal of destroying Moldova seems a more typical example, both impeding the development of democracy in Moldova and, of course, leading to a reasonably traditional soviet-style autocratic regime in Transnistria.
Second, the aim of maintaining the integrity of the state could be so important that the realization of democratic principles is sacrificed. The Russian case is an example of this approach. Russia tolerated, or arguably even initiated, the most serious human rights violations in Chechnya, leading to a semi-autocratic regime in the whole state:
A country violating the most basic human and political rights in a part of its territory cannot be classified as a democracy. These examples show that certain minority strategies, even if they can be justified by the principle of self-determination, have a potential to seriously endanger the transformation process during the phase of institutionalization.
Consolidation:
The separation between integrationist and exclusionist minority strategies remains relevant also during the period of consolidation. However, the stakes are lower during this phase because the regime has already had some time to stabilize.
The options are no longer whether to maintain or break up the state -by definition, democracy itself has already gained support among both elites and the general population. A supportive consensus about the principles of democracy has been established and to some extent been tested. Those forces within the minority favouring selfdetermination in a separate state have been marginalized and the extent of autonomy and development granted by the majority is large enough to satisfy most minority members. If it were otherwise, the stability of the new regime would be threatened to such an extent that it would be difficult to speak of a process of consolidation.
Democratic consolidation can bear different faces, however. The path to a fully developed polyarchy in the understanding of Robert Dahl means high rates of inclusion for the whole population and, following on from that, adequate representation in political institutions. This is certainly a supportable aim of democracy. However, exactly which political forces are represented in parliament or even government also matters.
Exclusive regimes are not fully democratic, but polarized regimes have a strong tendency of becoming non-democratic. 54 In the whole region, the polarization of party systems has proved to be one of the major factors for deciding the quality of democratic consolidation.
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It is for this reason that the temporary exclusion of minorities from political participation may be justified from a theoretical perspective. The argument can go in two di- 54 See Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems (Cambridge, 1976 
